Criminal Justice in America: A Critical View Essay

Criminal justice Introduction   Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚   Criminal justice is a system of government institutions, which are tasked with upholding social control, and directed at mitigating crimes as well as sanctioning   the law breakers with criminal penalties as and rehabilitation efforts as well.   Criminal justice covers a number of areas including; law enforcement, juvenile cases, correction and crime prevention. Criminal justice cases at level 200 cover a wide range of areas including policies on sentencing and practice, theories of policing and their effects criminal justice practice. As well as familiarizing with a wide range of police powers especially those involving searching and arrest powers.   Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚   The central role of law in social processes is explored under criminal justice 200, with primary legal regimes of various types being examined and compared from different national contexts as well as across different international context. Legal and non-legal reforms, those of social ordering, are contrasted; investigating human rights law in its practice and structure. Level 200 also focuses on ‘Disability studies’. Theories on how the society interprets disability and consequences in social justice. Factors and determinants that frame disability are factored. These factors include social, political, biological, cultural and economical determinants (Sheldon et al; 455).   Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚   On this paper, I will feature a case that will seek to examine how the judicial system decided to take a shift in the way juveniles were treated at trial in cases of criminal nature. The system saw it necessary to put into consideration the psychological factors, on growth of adolescents’ brains especially, when determining these cases as the aim of the system is more of reforming than punishing. Over the years, most states have believed the Juvenile system in the Judicial system is set up for public protection by providing a mechanism to respond to children who are getting into crime as they mature into adulthood. The children who commit these crimes are believed to be less dangerous and blameworthy hence the need to differentiate them from adults doing the same. States have been responsive to these differences and have in turn established separate court systems to cater for the juveniles. They have also provided separate youth-bas ed systems on service delivery that are different from those of adults.   Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚   Juvenile systems have grown remarkably since their first introduction. The first juvenile court was established in 1899 in the state of Illinois. At the time, the process was rather informal, consisting of conversations between the judge and the youth- with no legal representation for the youth. The system was aimed at creating a different probation system and replacing confinement of these youths in jails alongside the adults. A different approach to their incarceration was adopted which allowed for provision of guidance, education and supervision. All states later embraced the juvenile system including the then district of Columbia. In the year 1967, the ‘Re Gault’ landmark ruling by the Supreme Court determined the requirement of attorneys for youths in the system as well as provision of other constitutional rights like accused adults including confrontation of a witness before them. The Supreme Court later gave more consti tutional rights including undergoing trials requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt and against double jeopardy. However, some states give youths the right to trial y a jury through statutes and court rulings although the Supreme Court discouraged this (Bremna 342). Case ‘Miller v Alabama’   Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚   This case was a petition presented to the Supreme Court by the petitioner, Miller, against the state of Alabama. The case was argued on 20th March 2012 and was later decided on 25th June 2012. In this petition No. 10-9646, the petitioner by the name miller, with his friend beat up Miller’s friend seriously then continued to set his trailer on fire after a long evening of heavy drug abuse and drinking. The neighbor ended up dying. Initially, Miller had been charged by the court like juvenile, but when his case was later on removed and taken to an adult court, the court charged him with arson and murder. The jury found Miller guilty as charged and the trial court sentenced him to life without parole, which was a statutorily mandated punishment. The Alabama court dealing with appeals re-affirmed the ruling, arguing that Miller’s sentence was not even as harsh in comparison to the crime he had committed and the mandatory nature o f it was permissible according to the eighth amendment, which states that one should not be imprisoned for LWP for juvenile offenders that have committed homicide. The amendment forbids cruel and unusual punishments hence guaranteeing the defendant the right of refrain from being subjected to rather harsh sanctions. Punishment for a crime should be proportionate to both the crime and the offender. The amendment recognizes the lack of mental maturity n these youths, something that could lead to impulsiveness and recklessness as well as poor decision making (Adam 10).   Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚   This petitioned was argued and judgment given jointly with a case of the same nature, petition No. 10-9647 of ‘Jackson v Hobbs’ in which Jackson was charged with murder and thereafter sentenced to a life imprisonment with no parole. Jackson, a 14year old had taken part in a robbery where, unknown to him, one of his friends had carried a short gun with which he used to murder the clerk in the store. Jackson was charged by Arkansas as an adult with the crime of capital felony of murder alongside robbery. The jury found him guilty of both charges something that led to the sentence. The court likened life without parole to a death sentence (Adam 10).   Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚   On June 25 2012, the court gave a 5-4 ruling on the case, judging that a life imprisonment without parole was not constitutional if the accused is over the age of eighteen. The court was persistent on Graham’s foundational principle that states that the child status must be taken into account when passing such harsh judgments. Regardless of the crime committed, such severe penalties on juveniles cannot go on as if they were not children. The court also directed that sentences of life imprisonment without granting parole as such should be rare. The vulnerability of the children was taken into account as well as their high capability to change in the future and become better persons. The ruling would certainly have an after effect, especially on those whose sentencing did not take into account age and other mitigating factors (Adam 10).   Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚   This decision would see at least half of the states in America change their statutes on handling juvenile cases and sentences to life with no parole: including Alabama’s statute ‘code 13A’. Efforts to end harsh judgments and reduce solitary in confinement for juveniles were evident and efforts to close juvenile detention facilities as states started re-thinking of other ways on how to deal with juvenile offenders. Campaigns for youth reforms have been started with correctional facilities aimed at creating a view on young felons as victims of circumstances rather than felons who are irredeemable (Okonkwo 45). References Top of Form Shelden, Randall G, and William B. Brown. Criminal Justice in America: A Critical View. Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 2003. Print. Bottom of Form Daniel Okonkwo The New York Times- Applying The Miller v Alabama Ruling Retroactively Must Be Done, 2013 Adam Liptak, Ethan Bronnerthe New York Times- Justice Bar Mandatory Life Terms For Juveniles, 2012 Source document

Dystopian Short Story- Year 11

He stood looking down, staring. Like every other morning there was a paper crane lying on the ground. He picked it up and looked around hoping to catch the person who put it there, but there was no one else on the street. The paper crane was on his mind all day. The next morning he left early. He planned on waiting for the person who leaves the paper cranes. He hid at the corner of the street, three houses down from where the paper cranes always were. He had been standing then for twenty minutes and so far nothing had happened, so he stood to leave, but he stopped when he saw a girl emerge from the house that the paper cranes were always in front of. The girl looked around, then she lifted her hand and in her hand she held a paper crane. She lightly threw the paper crane and it landed in the exact same spot I find the cranes everyday. She smiled and retreated back into the house. He watched the girl retreat back inside the house, then he walked over and picked up the paper crane. Girl The next morning she got out of bed and got dressed. She went over to her desk and selected a piece of paper with hearts all over it. She was halfway through making a paper crane when she heard music outside. She stood and walked out onto her balcony and looked down over the edge. The boy who took her paper cranes everyday stood on the sidewalk surrounded by all the paper cranes she had made. He was playing a soft melodic song on a guitar. He looked up and smiled. He handed the girl a rose. â€Å"How was it did you like it? † He asked. She smiled at him and replied â€Å"Yes†. The girl started coughing, he frowned â€Å"Are you sick? † She looked down â€Å"Yes just a little.. † she said quietly. She said later that she was so sick she couldn’t go to school for six months. â€Å"I was wondering, why did you leave a paper crane out there every morning? † He asked. â€Å"Because I saw you walking by every morning†¦Ã¢â‚¬  The smiled â€Å"You did that because you missed me, didn’t you? † . He smiled. â€Å"This popularity of mine† he laughed. â€Å"By the way, I’m Max. What’s your name? † . â€Å"Summer† she replied. Summer? That’s so pretty† He grinned â€Å"Hmm†¦Then you sibling’s names would be Spring, Autumn and Winter? † She smiled â€Å"No I’m an only child† He looked thoughtful â€Å"How old are you? † â€Å"Seventeen† she replied. â€Å"What month birthday? â⠂¬  He asked â€Å"June†. â€Å"Since I am an April birthday, I guess that makes you the oldest† He smiled. Sunny began to cough badly. â€Å"Sunny† she continued to cough â€Å"Sunny? † he said again â€Å"Sunny! † Max was worried now â€Å" What’s wrong sunny? † he put his arms on her shoulders. â€Å"Are you okay Sunny? Sunny?! † The doctor walked out into the waiting room, and Max rushed to him. â€Å"What happened? † He asked. †Her condition has gotten worse†¦there’s no more hope† . Summer’s parent, who were seated in the waiting room, got up from their seats. â€Å"What? † Summer’s mother said. The doctor turned to the parents, â€Å"Didn’t I say she should have gotten hospital treatment earlier? † Summer’s father looked sad, â€Å"Our daughter, she wanted to stay home so badly. † Summers mother was crying, â€Å"What are we going to do? What are we going to do about our Summer? The doctor looked at them, â€Å"I think it’s time for you to prepare yourselves†¦Ã¢â‚¬  Max grabbed the doctor, â€Å"What does that mean?! † â€Å"There’s no month† He said. Tears rolled down Max’s cheeks, â€Å"Excuse me? Doctor. Save her, pease? Doctor, Doctor! † He fell to the floor and cried. †Å"Please save her he cried, please†. Max walked into the room where sunny lay in a bed within an enclosed glass area, he put his hand against the glass and looked down. Summer opens her eyes, and looks at him, â€Å"I didn’t want to show myself like this†¦Ã¢â‚¬  Max smiled kindly at her, â€Å"There’s nothing wrong with it. You’ll get better soon anyway. They said in about two weeks you’ll be fine. † Max pulled out his ipod, â€Å" I brought this so that you wouldn’t be bored. † He went to enter into the little room, â€Å"You can’t, You can’t come in† Summer said. Max pulled back â€Å" Then†¦what should I do? I really wanted you to hear this song, it’s my favourite lately. â€Å" He looked at Summer’s sad face and thought for a moment, then he put his ipod down, â€Å"Listen carefully it’s called I just want you† Max began to sing †¦ â€Å"There's something I gotta say to you, but I'm so afraid of what you'll do. Ooh ooh ooh ooh. I'll just admit this to you now, that I'm stuck on you like glue somehow. Ooh ooh ooh ooh†¦Ã¢â‚¬  As he sang tears rolled down Summer’s cheeks. And that’s how Max’s love hurt as soon as it started†¦ Max pushed Summer around the hospital garden in a wheelchair, â€Å"Man, it’s already spring. Summer, is there anywhere you want to go visit? † Summer looked sad â€Å"There is, but remember, I can’t go† Max looks down, â€Å"Hey, what do you mean you can’t go? Where is it? Tell me. I’ll bring a private jet and take you wherever you want to go† Summer smiles â€Å"Really? â€Å"Yes, really. So where is it? † â€Å"In my hometown there’s a hill with a tree. It’s the tree my dad planted the day I was born† Max looked down in surprise, â€Å"A tree? † â€Å"Yeah. I want to see how big it’s gotten†¦before I die† Max stopped pushing â€Å"Hey , why would you die?! If you say that one more time, I’m just going to kiss you. † Summer smiles. â€Å"In any case, don’t worry. I promise to take you there† That night, Max wraps a blanket around Summer and they sneak out of the hospital. They get on a bus, and Summer sits with her head against Max and rests. After a while Sunny opens her eyes and without looking up she says â€Å"I want to hear that song†¦Ã¢â‚¬  Max looks down at her â€Å" I just want you† she whispers. â€Å"Really? Hold on. â€Å" Max grabs his ipod and places the headphones in her ears, and presses play. He smiles and slides his hand through her hair†¦ lock of hair comes away with his hand, and he looks at. Max leans his head against the window of the bus†¦and silently cries. Max is carrying Summer on his back as they walk down a tree lined road. â€Å"Aren’t I heavy? † She asks. â€Å"No† he smiles, â€Å"Wow, my Summer is so light. You need to gain some weight. I’m going to feed you chicken, hamburgers, and lots of vegetables† Summer hates vegetables â€Å"I can’t eat vegetables† she says. â€Å"Fine, Then I’ll eat them and get strong, so I can piggy back you every day. † â€Å"What if I get so fat you can’t carry me? † she asks. Max stops â€Å"Hmm†¦then I can get just as fat, and we can roll around together† Summer laughs â€Å"You’re crazy† she stops laughing and begins to cough. She puts a handkerchief against her mouth so she doesn’t cough on Max and when she pulls it away its covered in blood. Max sees it and his eyes widen in shock.

“Great Expectations”, “Romeo and Juliet” and “To Kill a Mocking Bird” Essay

â€Å"Great Expectations†, â€Å"To Kill a Mocking Bird†, and â€Å"Romeo and Juliet† are all very diverse pieces of literature. Each piece of literature is unique to one another, but they all share common characteristics and themes. All of the works include a key character that gains understanding of himself resulting from events in his life that caused confusions or prejudice. Pip, the main character of Great Expectations, learns a great amount resulting from confusion in his life. His confusion is caused by his love for Estella, a beautiful and proper girl of the upper-class. Pip becomes intrigued by Estella the moment Ms. Havisham, Estella’s guardian, has him over to visit. Ms. Havisham encourages and strengthens Pip’s feeling for Estella by always reminding him of Estella’s beauty and intelligence. As Pip grows older, his love for Estella never fades. Pip becomes confused when Estella makes him think that he may have a chance with her when in reality she doesn’t love him at all. Estella is incapable of loving because Ms. Havisham taught her to hide her affection and love and to never open up to a man. Once Pip realizes that he will never marry Estella he learns never to set his mind on one thing and that he must keep an open mind. Jem, the main character of To Kill a Mocking Bird, learns a lot from the prejudice he must experience in his life resulting from a trial his dad is involved in. Jem’s dad is defending a black man who was accused of raping a young girl in town. This is especially hard for Jem because he is growing up in a very racist southern town and time. Even though the majority of the people in the town know the black man is innocent, his color causes them to discriminate against him and accuse him as being guilty. The things Jem must experience as a result of the trial, such as getting beat up by a grown man, teach him many things about his life. He learns to give every person a chance no matter what their race, gender, or any other classifying features are. Most importantly, Jem learns to never cower down from what he believes in and to never give up. Juliet, the main character of the play Romeo and Juliet, also learns a lot from the confusion in her life. Romeo and Juliet fall in love at first sight. Unfortunately Romeo and Juliet must express their love in secret  because their families are arch enemies. Juliet becomes confused a number of times throughout the play because she is put in the position of choosing between her lover and her family. For example, when Romeo kills Juliet’s cousin, she doesn’t know who to side with. Juliet decides to go against her family and quickly forgive Romeo. She figures love is the most important thing. Juliet learns that to be happy you must follow your heart. Even though the play ends in tragedy, the only thing that would make Juliet happy was to be with Romeo, even if it was in the afterlife. As one can see Pip, Jem, and Juliet all learned important lessons from their experiences. The confusion in Pip and Juliet’s lives and the prejudice in Jem’s cause them all to come to conclusions about themselves and their lives. Overall, the lessons each character learned helped them to become a better person who was more aware of himself.

E U LAW REPORT Essay Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 1000 words

E U LAW REPORT - Essay Example The legal basis for the audit is to inspire cost reduction efforts in the management of EU affairs at the national level by reducing bureaucracy and external interference in issues that should be resolved at the national level. The audit is also aimed at enhancing better participation of UK in the international body and safeguarding UK’s internal democratic ideals and structures. According the William Hague, the EU needs change in how current challenges should be best handled. The reform would streamline competitiveness; guarantee member countries and the entire region a stable Eurozone and expanded democratic goals (Rostron, 2006). Finally, the UK government believes that a clear structure of authority that spans from local, national, and international levels should prevail in order to eliminate chances of duplication of duties and meddling by parties who lack the locus standi in such jurisdictions. Legal basis Justice and law enforcement The European Union has imposed 130 cr ime and law enforcement regulations including warrant of arrest (Costello, 2012). Although, some parties believe the regulations enhance the effort of many enforcement agencies and security apparatus in the war against cross-border crime, the UK government believes such laws infringe on its sovereignty. ... Employment law The EU’s employment and social law envisages the working-time policy whereby there is a limit on the number of hours of service for employees a day. The rationale is based on health and safety grounds. The EU has also imposed policies which regulate casual workforce environment. Long perceived in Conservative lens as a breach of UK’s open labour market, the employment law has brought the Tories and the Liberal Democrats together. The government of the UK feels that there is a decrease in productivity because local investors are forced to adhere to stricter EU terms instead of working under UK’s free labour market. Financial sector The expected establishment of a common banking union has created panic among investors in the banking industry in regard to whether the new measures might infringe on the local and smaller financial institutions (Vletter-van & Helene, 2012). The UK government wants to protect its national interests but it may not be easil y achieved under the current status quo. EU’s influence is enormous in the sector. Regional policy EU’s regulation policy has also prompted Britain to review the rules. One of the fundamental issues raised by detractors of the EU is that the body’s mandate is somewhat unclear. For instance, how come the international body takes colossal sums of money from Britain only to re-channel the money back to the country’s economically weak sectors? (Rostron, 2006) UK’s regions such as Merseyside and Northern Ireland have in the recent past gained lots of support from EU. Like the UK government, critics argue that the country would be better placed to reform EU’s policies and use the money in more productive national sectors. Potential Criticisms Firstly, the government has emphasized that it is

Financial Analysis Essay Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 2000 words - 3

Financial Analysis - Essay Example For this purpose, the performance of the company for the last few years has been taken into consideration. The results are compared with that of its competitors to determine the relative position of the company within the industry. Comparison will also be made with the industry standards to determine the effectiveness with which it manages its performance. Marks & Spencer (M&K) is a UK based retail company that offer products known for their high quality. The product portfolio of Marks & Spencer is highly diversified, comprising of food products, household related goods, apparel and many more. The company started as a single retail store in early 1884 and became an international retail chain in a matter of few years. Within a time span of 125 years, the company had diversified itself and entered more than 41 overseas territories. It boasts of 21 million footfalls per shop per week (M&S-a, 2010). To determine the short term performance of the company, its financial statements for the last three years will be taken into consideration. This time period will be stretched to 5 years to understand its long term trend. To determine the current position of the company, its present performance in 2009-2010 is compared with that of 2007-2008. Such comparison is initiated to understand the effect that economic recession had on the company. This will also help to analyse how the company managed to overcome the recessionary phase. Reports have revealed that recession had no major impact on the total revenue of the company. Only, a fall of 0.44 percent was registered in the total revenue. However, the operating profitability did suffer a fall of 28 percent. In the same way, the net profit (profit after tax) also reduced by 38 percent. As the operational cost increased, the management reduced its net debt by 19 percent. From the above fact and figures, it can be concluded that the revenue of M&S was affected marginally

The Rainmaker Film Movie Review Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 1000 words

The Rainmaker Film - Movie Review Example Nevertheless, The Rainmaker did relatively well and its actors got good reviews. Its director, Francis Ford Coppola, who also did the screenplay, got positive comments as well. According to Roger Ebert, "I have enjoyed several of the movies based on Grisham novels ... but I've usually seen the storyteller's craft rather than the novelist's art being reflected. ... By keeping all of the little people in focus, Coppola shows the variety of a young lawyer's life, where every client is necessary and most of them need a lot more than a lawyer." (Ebert) The plot of the movie revolves much around Rudy Baylor, a young lawyer who would have wanted to make it big in very first case that he handles. Being the central figure, the main conflict of the film dwells on his first legal challenge, a case regarding a family's struggle to make an insurance company pay for the surgical operation of a son afflicted with leukemia. While doing so, Baylor also has to deal with the conflict between making money a priority as a lawyer and standing up for the 'small people' against a huge unscrupulous insurance firm, Great Benefit, and its host predatory lawyers led by Leo Drummond. The conflict between making his profession as a milking cow and dignifying it by accommodating a worthy cause of the less-privileged is even made more intense as Baylor is partnered by a six-time bar flunker, Deck Schifflet. Schifflet tries to convince him to do everything, including illegal methods, just to win the case and bag a huge sum of attorney's fees from the defenda nt insurance company. Acknowledging Schifflet's rich experience and his grave lack of it, Baylor later agrees to the suggestions especially when he developed a passion in fighting for the oppressed claimants. At one point the conflict between self-interest and the interests of his lowly clients peaked seemingly when has to take measures in helping the woman he loved, Kelly Riker, from a violently abusive husband. All these conflicts, of course, are resolved at the end of the movie. Baylor and his clients, the Blacks, won the case against Drummond and Great Benefit. This has been done partly because of the Baylor's litigation skills and Schifflet's off-hand tactics. However, an Afro-American judge with a good background in civil rights also contributed much to the victory. Drummond and Great Benefit, in a desperate but wicked move to save the insurance firm's profits filed for bankruptcy and got it. The Blacks never won the amount of money they want to claim. Baylor and Schifflet never got the millions of attorney's fees they worked hard for. Nevertheless, the movie ends with a lesson that a truly worthy cause cannot be bought by any amount of money. Baylor did not get the huge amount he and Schifflet dreamed for but wins friends, respect and a good promising future in the legal profession. As icing on the cake, he also wins Kelly. Matt Damon plays the role of Rudy Baylor. While some roles are tailor-made for an actor, Damon's case in The Rainmaker is different. He just naturally fits the role. He has no physical features that may grant him the usual star qualities according to the standards of Hollywood. His acting is not really as convincing as most other stars. However, in this particular film, Damon's acting fits the role perfectly. Baylor's character is that of freshman lawyer who is lacking in confidence while beset with

Wheel Works Cycling Company Business. Case Study Essay

Wheel Works Cycling Company Business. Case Study - Essay Example Some other researchers (e.g., Friedlander, (1964) refers to motivation as, â€Å"the amount of effort people are willing to put in their work depends on the degree to which they feel their motivational needs will be satisfied. On the other hand, individuals become de-motivated if they feel something in the organisation prevents them from attaining good outcomes (Friedlander 1964). It can be observed from the above definitions that, motivation in general, is more or less basically concern with factors or events that moves, leads, and drives certain human action or inaction over a given period of time given the prevailing conditions. Further more the definitions suggest that there need to be an† invisible force† to push people to do something in return. It could also be deduced from the definition that having a motivated work force or an environment in which high levels of motivation are maintained remains a challenge for today’s management. This challenge may emanate from the simple fact that motivation is not a fixed trait –as it could change with changes in personal, psychological, financial or social factors. 1.1 Maslow's Hierarchy of Need Maslow's hierarchy of needs is a five-level hierarchical need theory of motivation that specifies that the lowest-level unsatisfied need has the greatest motivating potential (Greenberg & Baron 2003):. The needs include: Physiological needs Safety needs Belongingness needs Esteem needs Self-actualization needs According to Maslow, the lowest-level unsatisfied need category has the greatest motivating potential. When needs at a particular level of the hierarchy are satisfied, the individual turns his or her attention to the next higher level. A satisfied need is no longer an effective motivator. Self-actualization needs, however, become stronger as they are gratified (Greenberg and Baron 2000). At Wheelworks, to satisfy employee's needs following Maslow's doctrine, the Male Speaker does all personnel selection on personnel encouragement. At the same time lot of

Stress Management Assignment Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 1750 words

Stress Management - Assignment Example In fact, Statistics from the American Institute of Stress cited by Seaward (2013) shows that approximately 43 percent of grown-ups experience unpleasant consequences in terms of their health owing to stress. This paper explicates the relationship between stress and nutrition. The phrase You are what you eat is a common slogan today. In laymans terms, this phrase denotes the fact that the health status of human beings is directly related to the quantity and quality of food they consume. In other words, consumption of insufficient amounts of food and of poor quality can affect the health of an individual. In reference to stress, food can either cause stress or can therapeutically alleviate and prevent stress from the body (Bargir, 2013). Obesity and overweight as explicated by Tomiyama et-al (2010) is a common problem particularly in developed countries such as the US. To support this postulation, Tomiyama et-al (2010) notes that approximately one-third of adult individuals in the US are struggling with obesity. Due to the health effects associated with overweight and obesity, a great proportion of these individuals are continuously trying to lose weight. A common trend to achieving this is depriving the body sufficient amounts of food in an effort to reduce caloric intake. Tomiyama et-al (2010) argues that withdrawal from a diet educes depressing feelings or sentiments. Subsequently, feelings of hopelessness, decreased levels of confidence, and a bad temper may also arise, and these are common indicators of stress. Withdrawal from a regular diet also elevates the production of a stress hormone referred to as cortisol in the body (Tomiyama et-al, 2010). Though there are issues relating to nutrition that can elevate stress levels, stress itself can conversely affect nutrition. The Stress Management Society and Bodychef (n.d) assert that stress can lead to poor food consumption practices. For instance, incidences of stress

750 words essay Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 750 words

750 words - Essay Example Buddhism summarizes a spiritual life in four tenets. This entails the truth of suffering, the truth of the reason for suffering, the truth of suffering’s end, the truth of the path that leads towards enlightenment. The first tenet means that life must always possess suffering. In turn, suffering is an inalienable part of life that individuals should not hold as strange. Acceptance of suffering does not connote nihilism, but acceptance of the world as it occurs. In such a pragmatic frame, the individual learns how one can rectify the problem of suffering. The religion does not deny the concept of pleasure, but classifies the same as a fleeting value (Ganeri 67). This also applies to happiness, which is a monetary feeling. In the end, sickness, aging, and death are the only inevitable elements. The second truth deals with the cause of suffering. The Buddha states that desire and ignorance are the two main causes of suffering. Desire relates to pursuit for pleasure, material thin gs, and immortality. Since these wants are insatiable, desiring them fuels suffering in people. Ignorance, on the other hand, refers to not perceiving the world as it occurs. When an individual lacks insight and foresight, the mind remains static since it is unable to perceive the true nature of life. Buddhism emphasizes on the mind as the principal precept for attaining Nirvana. This is because the mind is essential in controlling desires and emotions. The texts liken this principle to the act of herding an ox such that it does not stray into other people’s farms. Buddhism recognizes that the senses may become uncontrollable if the individual does not chain them with one’s mind. In this view, indulgence in desires and limited application of the mind in life suffocates the spirituality of a person. Buddhism emphasizes on the need for learning in order to achieve enlightenment. When a person is born,

Ethical Issues Regarding Informed Consent in the Workplace Essay

Ethical Issues Regarding Informed Consent in the Workplace - Essay Example Different participants at these establishments have different views and beliefs on what is ethical and what is not ethical. An important concept to be derived from the study of ethics is that its applications in the different fields are interrelated and one application can be used to explain the other in a different field (Hardwig, 2010, p.1). Nevertheless, a lesson learned from ethical issues arising in business could be used to solve analogous issues in medicine or any other field. 2. The need for â€Å"informed consents† The controversial issues arising in ethics are due to the diverse human nature and the difference in cultural values. What an individual values most may be of very little value to the other person. In medical ethics, it would be considered that main aim of providing healthcare services is to promote good health and ensure a longer life for the patients. However, there are other factors that affect human desires and that will limit our access to the health s ervices (Hardwig, 2010, p.1). It would be argued that the health providers should make all the attempts to satisfy the needs of the patients by avoiding issues like the cost consideration. This becomes controversial as a point may be reached when the operations at the health center cannot continue due to lack of resources thereby endangering other people’s lives. Besides, it is worth mentioning the fact that a patient went to the hospital to seek medical services does not mean that the medical officer has a full say on what to be carried out, neither does it mean that the patient needs all that the doctor wants to provide or perform (Hardwig, 2010, p.1). Similarly, the view a shareholder would be that his profit in an investment be maximized. However, there will be other factors that influence the desires and that will determine if the profit maximization is the supposed interest. The effects of this profit maximization on the conditions imposed on the employees of an organiz ation will provide an evidence to evaluate such procedures. In most causes, it would turn out to be unjustifiable for an investor to be only interested in the profit maximization (Hardwig, 2010, p.1). These controversial issues call for what is referred to as â€Å"informed consent.† It involves informing the participants to a given decision making activity the probable risks and the conditions associated with the actions to be carried out (Ilgen & Bell, 2001, p.1). It is aimed at ensuring that ethical standards are observed in handling individuals with different interests. It has been found to be applicable in various fields of social sciences that entail research with human participants. The participants in a research need to be informed of the risks involved in participating in the research. However, the American Psychologist Association asserts that there are certain instances when the use of â€Å"informed consents† can be ignored, though it may not be very clear the circumstances under which this may be true. Various legislations have been enacted in the US that protects the rights of the participants in a given research (White, Parascandola & Bero, 2007, p.1). 3. Ethical issues and informed consent in medicine The basic guiding principles that most people value like profit maximization in business or good health and prolonged life in the healthcare

Sales planning and operations Assignment Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 1000 words

Sales planning and operations - Assignment Example n mix is business tools that are used by entrepreneurs to pass information effectively to customers regarding the various benefits of their goods and services (Baker 2014). Therefore, it involves combining strategies and allocating resources in a cost-effective way. One of the objectives of a promotional mix is to increase the demand of a product or service. During product cycle, this strategy is used to increase the sales although a product may reach a saturation point, and the company turns to a new product. The Second objective is presenting information about the existence of the products and services. The customers or consumers need to understand the full information about the product that may include its availability and benefits. The last objective is to differentiate the product. In circumstances when we have many competitors in the market, firms opt to differentiate their products to look different from what their competitors offer. Personal selling is face to face or a direct two-way communication between the buyer and seller with an aim of making a sale. Moreover, it involves developing a good relationship with the customer, identifying their needs and also adjusts the products to fit their needs. More companies prefer personal selling because it results to more profit although it is costly. Personal selling is considered as more efficient in business growth. Therefore, it plays vital roles in supporting the achievements of goals of the promotional mix. Personal selling increases the demand of products and services by increasing the products’ awareness towards purchase. When customers become aware of the availability of the product, then its demand will increase since they will start buying it. Through presenting information to the customers, personal selling is good at explaining the products’ information or any aspect related to the products hence giving explicit information regarding the product (Smith, Gopalakrishna & Smith 2004). Business

Go therefore and make disciples of all nations Essay Example for Free

Go therefore and make disciples of all nations Essay Go therefore and make disciples of all nations. Matthew 28.14. What does this command of Jesus mean? Thomas Kee 9/10 In todays society people can make others into disciples without realising it. The world relies on a few people to act as examples and model Christians to set an example for others. These are people like Mother Teresa who stepped aside from the normal routine of life to give up theirs to help others. In 1948 Mother Teresa was granted permission to leave her post at the convent and begin a ministry among the sick. In 1952 Mother Teresa opened the Nirmal Hriday (Pure Heart) Home for Dying Destitutes in Calcutta. Subsequently she extended her work to five continents. The rich young man ( Matthew 19:16-30), A wealthy Jew asked Jesus what he needs to do to receive eternal life. Jesus answers him that he needs to obey the commandments. The man then asks him what he needs to do to be perfect. Jesus answered him that he needs to give up everything he owns and to follow Jesus. However, the man refused and walked away sadly. This story is an example of someone who cannot give up all his money to be a true disciple, but people like mother Teresa who give up everything they have to help the sick, poor and those in need. By doing this they help people on the road to discipleship by acting as examples. Happy are those who are humble, You can lead people on the road to discipleship by being a good Christian. You dont have to preach to them and show off how holy you are, but be kind, generous and helpful and they will learn from you. People can recognize you and learn how to be a good disciple from you, if you do missionary work in another country. If you have the money and time you could go to a poor country and set up a school or a hospital. For some this can be too much, so even small sponsorships or helping the local parish can set an example to others and make them think how they can help. By helping your local church you can set an example, you could help the priest in preparing the sermons or you could read at masses, Happy are those who are spiritually poor. Matthew 5v3 You dont have to make a great scene, but try to be discreet and people will recognize you. Those who are ashamed of me I will be ashamed of them on the last day. By standing up and defending the church against those who oppose it, others will notice you and follow you as an example. Thomas Kee 10/10 There are many people who have taken up the challenge of doing great good; each and every one of them is a great example to the world. Happy are those who are prosecuted for doing what God requires. Terry Waite was a special envoy to the Archbishop of Canterbury. He was a negotiator who was trying to free hostages in Lebanon but was taken hostage himself. For five years he was chained to a tiny cell 23 hours of the day. Throughout this time he didnt lose his faith I am not a man who wears his faith on his sleeves, Ive never believed it is an insurance policy: we dont live in a just or fair world. If you have faith you can say suffering neednt destroy, that something good can emerge from it. But faith is there to shape your life, not to give you special protection. Terry Waite Go therefore and make disciples of all nations, This commandment can present a problem in modern day context. Although it is the word of God, people may not be interested in the teachings of Christianity. For It is Gods wish and command that people should preach the word of God. By preaching you are giving others the chance to receive eternal life. There is nothing bad about Christianity, its morals are all good. People are not forced to become Christian, they have the choice. Against You may want to discover Christianity for yourself, you may not want it told to you. Preaching may put people off. It is wrong to force it onto people. In some countries it is illegal to be a practicing Christian. By preaching Christianity in these countries you are encouraging them to break the law. I believe it is a Christians duty to go out into the world spreading the teachings of Jesus Christ. However I understand that people will not always welcome Christianity into their lives. It is probably true that actions speak louder than words and by setting an example by being a good Christian is more effective then preaching in spreading the word of God. Bibliography Encarta 99 Class notes The Bible

Design of the The Brion Tomb by Carlos Scarpa

Design of the The Brion Tomb by Carlos Scarpa In my study I intend to explain Carlo Scarpas thinking in his design of the Tomba brion vega, his most visited work and analyse the design of each element individually and as a whole. It is a site of elegance and poetry and epitomises Carlo Scarpas use of architecture to produce meaning and feeling. Carlo Scarpa himself describes the tomb as a pathway (Unora con Carlo Scarpa The Brion Tomb is situated in the north of Italy in the village San Vito dAltivole near Treviso. It was designed for the family Brion by Carlo Scarpa after the death of Giuseppe Brion. It was commissioned by the wife of Giuseppe, Onorina Brion; together they co-founded the electronics firm Brion-Vega. Giuseppe was born in San Vito and the family owned a plot of land in the local cemetery as well as a funerary chapel which originally stood on the site. Scarpas original idea and his early work for the family was for a number of seperate tombs for different family members on the original cemetery plot. These early designs were to later incorporated in to the final design. in 1969 the family bought an L shaped plot of land wrapped around the northern and eastern sides of the existing cemetery. Acquiring this plot of land allowed Scarpa to incorporate all the family tombs into a single master plan for the Brion families resting place. Not taking with the mainline trend that with money and power when death occurs a huge shrine or monument should be erected in memorial Scarpa went the opposite way. Scarpa states I believe it is mistaken to consider the Brion Cemetery the product of a wealthy capitalist. Rather it is quite the opposite. Of course I could have just made a large statue and left the rest a lawn, but I enjoy making things doing this he avoided the narrow dictates of rationalism, choosing rather to stress inner depth, dreams, and nostalgia. In this he creates a poetic resting place as much as a sculptural memorial in a green, calming garden. In March 1970 the Plans for the site had reached their final form and planning permission was given for construction. The Cemetery was completed in 1978 and is regarded by many as Scarpas masterpiece. Below is a quote from Scarpa on his design of the Brion Tomba. I consider this work, if you permit me, to be rather good and (something) which will get better over time. I have tried to put some poetic imagination into it, though not in order to create poetic architecture but to make a certain kind of architecture that could emanate a sense of formal poetry. I mean an expressed form that can become poetry, though, as I said before, you cannot intentionally make poetry. The deceased has asked to be close to (the) Earth since he was born in this village So I decided to build a small arch, which I will call Arcosolium. Arcosolium is a Latin term from the time of the early Christians in the Catacombs. Important persons or martyrs were buried in them.) I used a more costly version I thought it (was) a good idea for two people who had loved each other to be put in such a way as to be able to greet one another, after death. Soldiers stand erect, movements are human. The Arcosolium became an arch, a bridge span, an arch of reinforced concrete and would still have looked like a bridge if I hadnt had it illustrated, I mean decorated. But instead of painting we used mosaics, A Venetian tradition that I interpreted in a different way The statement above just shows how much thought went in to the design of his lifes masterpiece. The body of the cemetery The L shaped site has 5 main focal points; the arcosolium which was of great importance was placed on the north eastern corner to in Scarpas words benefit from the best view and sunniest exposure. The arcosolium acts as a kind of visual hinge on the L shaped site joining the north and eastern sides of the site. The family graves are situated on the north wall of the site sheltered underneath a canopy which shelters them from the elements. On the south side of the L shape is a pavilion which floats over a Lilly pond. To the western end he designed square chapel which leads to a private burial ground for local priests. Another entrance way to the site was constructed close to the pavilion where the original funerary chapel stood. The site is enclosed by a 2.3m high wall. Internally the views out from the site almost become a part of the design and Looking towards the site the 60deg slope of the wall directs sight over the cemetery causing minimum obstruction of the views out from the town whilst also masking its internal parts. Scarpa acknowledged that he had captured the sense of the countryside, as the Brions wished (Scarpa 1978-84) The Arcosolium The Arcosolium in history has been situated within a catholic burial chamber. A single catacomb would contain multiple arcosolium for important people and martyrs. They are arched recesses carved from solid rock with a solid stone coffin sarcophagus to the bottom. The arch and around it were often decorated with symbolic frescoes. In the image to the left is the arcosolium which is situated in Via Latina, Cubiculum E, a catacomb in Rome. You can clearly see the arched recess to the rear and the religiously painted walls. Scarpas arcosolium is the main focal point for the whole tomb, acting as a hinge between the two perpendicular areas of the site. The two heads of the family are buried here and is therefore sited with importance and was built on the north east corner of the site. Unlike the solid arch of the historic catholic arcosolium the arch Scarpa designed is sleek and slender and is made out of concrete and bows over the sunken ground on which sit the two sepulchers. The asymetical arch has four components or visual nuances which make the whole. The arch itself is visually two parts with the vertical main arch or the backbone spanning the sepulchres and below this sits a floating plane which shelters the crypts. The backbone has four fins which run the length of the arch. These fins are closed to their underside so to shelter the occupants. The two floating planes are decoratively layered to their topside rather like the arcosolium decoration of old. These are connected to the third and fourth components of the arch by pin joints and are the two concrete plinths which sit at the two ends of the arch and ground the design and also convert the otherwise compressional structure of an arch in to a tensile structure. The plinths themselves are split in to two parts with a solid mass capping the arch and a more dynamic form ending the completed arch. The plinths are decorated not with paintings or materials but with the zig zag form which dominates the cemetary. The two concerete plinths are orthogonally stepped three dimensionally lessening with weight the further away from the arch they are. Below the arch the two sepulchres sit in a sunken circular bowl which is sheltered by the arch above. Originally this circular base plate was to be surrounded by a water channel emanating from the north pool. The tombs themselves are made out of two tone marble with the sides facing each other being ebony, the top layer a speckled, black marble and the bottom layer a more grained white marble. The ebony planks on the facing planes of the coffins give them a softer touch. The two crypts are sat side by side underneath the arch and lean to each other as though they were trying to touch. This is also reiterated on the underside of the masses. Scarpa not wanting to ground the two objects too much curved the underside of them making them seem moveable and not stuck to the ground. Scarpa described it like this It is as it should be that the two people who loved each other in life to bend toward each other in greeting after death. A sense of Scarpas romance can be seen here. In Yutak Saitos book Carlo Scarpa, he describes how the two sepulchres are perceived to float like two boats beneath the arch. This is reminiscent of the buildings of Scarpas beloved Venice. Whilst under the arch the coloured glass tiles can be seen. Yutak Saito says The ceiling of the arch is covered in glass tiles, giving the sense of celestial brilliance The glass tiles run either side of an onyx strip which runs down the middle of the four fins of the arch, these omit a milky white translucence . Brion Tomba graveyard entrance The entrance lies down an avenue of trees which run the old Village Cemetery. Upon approach the first thing noticed is the two intersecting circles which lay at the end of the small corridor and their framed picture of the lawn and the ivy covered wall beyond. The entrance is sat beside other existing tombs and its scale is as those of the existing tombs. This gives the Brion Tomb a tardis like feel once inside having entered through here. The entrance is decorated with a zigzag design like the arcosolium with horizontal slices through the mass in which the sky or in Scarpas eye the heavens can be seen. On entering the square entrance opens up like a cave and upon speaking strange echoes bounce off the zigzagged inside. Again horizontal slices allow the sight of the heavens whilst inside this dark entrance way. Four steps lead up to the corridor beyond. These are slightly offset to the left hand side giving you a sense of direction in which one should travel. This small gesture The intersecting circles at the end of the corridor are rimmed with red and blue glass tiles. They signify the earth and the heavens and the earth and the intersected section signifies the spiritual world which may lie in between. You can also see this looking through the two circles with the green grass signifying the earth the sky the havens and the grey concrete wall which splits the two the spiritual world. With these two connotations Scarpa wanted to instil a sense of how close the three worlds are and how they intersect with each other. The corridor splits left and right now. The left hand side is brighter and beckons you down, another path indicator of which Scarpa is well known for. Looking down the corridor the left hand side of the arcosolium can be seen with the countryside in the background and the corrid or opens a few metres down. It opens to the right with the left hand side continuing further. At the transitional point between open and closed a water course continues the line of the structure which runs down in to the arcosolium adjacent to the walkway. Along this walkway are a set of offset steps which lead up to the grazed area above. These steps are of different thicknesses with each possessing a different sound when treaded upon. If you turn right at the corridor the path leads you down a darkened corridor which opens up onto a floating path which leads to the raised pavilion, the pavilion sits on the pond that feeds the watercourse. The Pavillion The pavilion sits on the north side of the site above a shallow body of water. At a distance it seems to float above the water. It is supported by a set of slender steel columns which rise out of the water. The idea behind the pavilion was to create a canopy under which the souls of the dead may enter to mediate. It is accessed via the main entrance way along a thin dark corridor and then through a glass door which is opened with an elaborate system of pulleys which are visible on the other side of the wall to the glass door. The top of the pavilion is clad in timber and Yutaka Saito in his book Carlo Scarpa notes the similarities in the depth and emphasis of the design relating to the series of torri gates of the fushimi Inari Shrine in Kyoto. Below the weathered timber box sits a thin metallic modesty panel painted green and is textured with a pattern of nails which softens the strong material making the space more comfortable. From its exterior the pavilion looks like a solid structure and a sense of weight is felt on sight but the innards are hollow which lets light pass down in to the space where underneath sits a bench on which Scarpa imagined the spirits could rest after they have had their playtime in the surrounding gardens of the cemetery. Its openness gives a connection between the spirit world and ours allowing passageway of souls in to it. Underneath the pavilion a small seating area is found for the spirits and this sits on a small jetty which seems to float a few centimetres above the pond. This may not be a piece of aesthetic design but a great knowledge of how water and construction materials react over time with staining and corrosion. This can also be seen on the back wall of the pavilion with it seeming to float just above the water level. Use of water Carlo Scarpa was of Venetian origin and this influenced his designs in that water and the effects it caused were often key elements of his designs. Bodies of water and/or water courses were elemental. He spent most of his life in Venice, wandering down its narrow gangways with buildings either floating on or reflected in water; a world changing with the ebb and flow of the tides. The brion tomb is no exception with Scarpa designing two pools at opposing ends of the site which were to be connected by thin streams that would weave inbetween the tombs connecting them with a sense of life or movement of the flowing water. A relationship between the lagoon and the canal can be envisioned here. The concept was not fully designed in but can still be seen in the form of a channel running between the pavilion and the arcosolium. Being from Venice Scarpa knew the effect of the tide and how this could effect materials and sometimes whole structures, submerging their lower floors on some occasions and the water course and pool in the cemetery were designed to avert flooding the adjacent spaces when it rains. The pools themselves are rather shallow being only half a metre in depth at their deepest point with the zig-zag pattern leading down to the lowest point giving the water a sense of volume and a place for the sun to play in, creating moving shadows and reflections of the surrounding structures during daytime hours. There are a number of water channels on the site. They all flow to the arcosolium and narrow as they get closer. This narrowing of the channels give the feeling of a sense of momentum and in essence, life. Brion Family Tomb The small family tomb is situated on the south side of the site and sits against the exterior wall giving a sense of shade for its occupants. It is a triangular shaped structure with a small entrance to the west. The entranceway is small and was designed so that to enter one must bow as a sign of respect to the deceased occupants. Internally the space is small yet the horizontal slits in the form allow the external openness to join with the internal space. The roof of the tomb narrows towards the top with a slice taken out at its peak. This was again the idea that the spirits could roam freely around the site and come back to their resting places for repose. The chapel and Sacristy The chapel sits on the east of the site and its importance is emphasised by the continual vertical planes that cut through the horizontal plane of the flat lawn. This emphasis shows its hierarchy and label the structure as being the building of most importance. There are two entrances to the chapel, one through the gardens and the second which is used for more formal occasions such as church mass. The entrance through the gardens shows this hierarchy the most, the tall walls create a strong vertical volume to travel down. Two small steps are at the entranceway and act as a transition between the less formal garden space and the more formal chapel beyond. On the left hand side wall a grid pattern of concrete lines was formed with 10mm recesses in which layers of plaster were trowelled and then polished which reflects light down the corridor. On this wall the door to the private sacristy can be found and follows the same grid patten as the walls slightly camouflaging it to identify its privacy. At the end of the corridor stands a large steel and plaster sliding lattice door reminiscent of the style of Otto Wagner of whom Scarpa was a fan and the traditional Japanese screen. Beyond the doors stands the chapel and the chinese style threshold that leads in to it which allows for the easy passage of coffins and on occasion to cope with a large numbers of people. The predominant material used in the construction of the chapel was again layered concrete. The floor is made of small cobble like stones which run at a 45deg angle to the room towards the alter. Two marble steps lead up to the alter and junctions between the materials was planned meticulously. The journey was very important in the planning of the site and all the senses were thought of when designing. Although the site is made up of lots of separate elements they are all part of the whole and are linked by pathways sometimes physical and sometimes psychological. http://www.greatbuildings.com/buildings/Brion-Vega_Cemetery.html

The Eurozone Crisis and EU Fiscal Governance Reform

The Eurozone Crisis and EU Fiscal Governance Reform   Framing the Eurozone Crisis: A Case of Limited Ambition Abstract The eurozone crisis provided a new opportunity for obtaining supranational fiscal integration within the European single currency area. This study applies a framing analysis to the crisis discourse that emerged from within the European Union’s (EU) intergovernmental forums involved in fiscal policy coordination. As well as linking policy frames to two different integration scenarios for the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), the broader influence of macroeconomic ideology is also emphasised. It is found that the response to the intensification of the crisis in Europe was to employ framing devices supporting intergovernmental fiscal discipline. While there were emergent supranational discourses over the longer term, these were reflective of a limited reform ambition. A key constraining factor here were the sovereignty concerns and issues of moral hazard circulating amongst member states, which together have ensured that a supranational fiscal policy is unlikely to be obtained i n Europe.   Introduction This article considers the response from within the intergovernmental forums to the eurozone crisis and the future prospects for fiscal supranationalism in Europe more broadly. When political scientists have turned their attention to the politics of the crisis, it has often figured as a case study to support the grand theoretical claims made by the ‘new intergovernmentalism’ (Bickerton et al. 2015; 2015a). This approach has tried to theorize a new paradox in European integration in the post-Maastricht era: ‘Member States pursue more integration but stubbornly resist further supranationalism’ (Puetter 2012, 168). Certain institutional dynamics associated with the new intergovernmentalism can be found to be at work within EMU where, particularly since the onset of the crisis, there have been marked increases in intergovernmental policy coordination within the European Council and ECOFIN Council structures (Hodson 2011; Puetter 2012). However, the approach is still at an early stage of development and deep empirical analysis of the political deliberations and policy environment within these settings are still lacking. Further criticisms have been made. In particular, Schimmelfennig (2015, 724) points out that, ‘They do not distinguish intergovernmentalism and supranationalism by the integration outcomes (either substantive or in terms of the level or scope of integration)’. Thus, claims of an ‘integration paradox’ taking place within EMU specifically or across the wider EU remain uncertain. This article focuses on the issue of EU fiscal governance reform following the intensification of eurozone crisis. The potential role of ideas as engines of policy change within EMU is a prospect taken seriously here (Dyson 2000). With this in mind, the  discursive institutionalist  theoretical framework proposed by Schmidt is employed (Schmidt 2008, 2010). This approach is well suited to considering the role of ideas and discourse interactions in bringing about change in an EU institutional context (see Schmidt 2015). It is applied through a framing analysis of the reform discussions that emerged from within the key intergovernmental forums involved in guiding the crisis response (Goffman 1974). This article identifies the dominant policy frames (‘problems’ and ‘solutions’) organising the reform debate, and links them to two alternative reform paths for EU fiscal governance: intergovernmental and supranational. In doing so, this article clarifies far more precisely the different political and economic policy options for reforming EMU governance, as well as previously underdetermined concepts such as ‘fiscal union’ and ‘political union’. As well as linking individual policy frames to different integration scenarios, the important role of macroeconomic ideology in guiding framing preferences is also emphasised. Theoretical and Methodological Framework It could be assumed that the eurozone crisis would confirm neofunctionalist  beliefs concerning the dynamics of the European integration  process: the weaknesses revealed in the asymmetric single currency area create strong pressures for a functional ‘spillover’ of supranational competencies to the European level (Rosamond 2005). However, when political scientists have turned their attention to the crisis, it has often been directed at the intensified intergovernmental policy coordination that has taken place within the European Council and ECOFIN Council (Hodson 2011; Puetter 2012; Bickerton et al. 2015; 2015a). While broader new intergovernmentalist claims of an ‘integration paradox’ in Europe involving integration without supranationalism remain undetermined (see Schimmelfennig 2015), these findings do suggest that deep supranational integration may not be obtained in EMU. Moreover, it has previously been found that a supranational reform agenda was not internalised by the Commission[1]. Together these findings are important as the long-term sustainability of the single currency area without significant steps being taken towards a more deeply integrated fiscal union has been questioned (De Grauwe 2013). Through a framing analysis this article will seek to explore if the crisis response from within the intergovernmental institutions was to push for supranationalism within EU fiscal governance, or alternatively, a retaining of intergovernmental control at the EU level. And, if the later course prevails, it will seek to offer a more complete theoretical explanation of why member states continue to resist supranationalism, even in the face of significant centralisation pressures. A deeper understanding of the political determinants of the EMU policy environment will also help facilitate a more complete explanation of why a supranational reform agenda was found not to have been internalised within DG ECFIN. The overarching theoretical framework informing this analysis is discursive institutionalism (Schmidt 2008; 2010). Of particular relevance here is the distinction made by discursive institutionalism between ‘coordinative discourse’—which takes place internally within the EU policy making setting—and ‘communicative discourse’—which take place externally between EU policy actors and the general public (Schmidt 2005). This study integrates discursive institutionalism alongside a frame analysis. Framing has been criticised for its lack of consistency in application of theory and method, with many different variants being operationalised without adequate clarification (Cacciatore et al. 2016). Framing has also been found to share common processes with agenda-setting and priming, although framing offers a more ‘encompassing conceptual approach’ (Aday 2006, 768). Here, a sociological approach to framing is adopted, which can be traced back to the work of Goffman (1974). A frame is understood as a ‘schemata of interpretation’, which can shape actors’ perceptions of reality and, in turn, influence political behaviour (Goffman 1974, 21). Inspired by Goffman’s approach, Benford and Snow (2000) make an important distinction between ‘prognostic’ and ‘diagnostic’ framing: the construction of particular  problem representations and possible solutions. This is valuable for facilitating a deeper understanding of the diagnosis of the causes of the eurozone crisis arrived at, as well as an exploration of the interlinking reforms suggested to solve or at least deal with the problems posed by the eurozone crisis.   Ideas within frames can be understood as occurring at different levels of generalisation: specific policy ideas related to problem and solutions (e.g. strengthened rules-based surveillance versus debt mutualisation); normative ideas which attach value to political action (e.g. fiscal discipline versus fiscal solidarity); and finally these can be connected to programmatic ideas related to broader policy paradigms and ideologies (Schmidt 2005; 2008). As a means to locate the key framing ideas that are likely to figure in the institutional discourse on the eurozone crisis, a wider review of the reform literature on EU fiscal governance will be completed (see the section below, ‘Literature Review’). Table (1) helps to link the different problem and solution policy frames that will be uncovered as part of this discussion to two different integration scenarios for EMU: intergovernmental and supranational. As well as showing how ideas relate to different policy measures (proble ms and solutions) and normative arguments, the wider role of macroeconomic ideology in guiding framing preferences for EMU reform is also highlighted here. Following a framing analysis, the dominant frames uncovered will also be explored in relation to the wider interplay between ideas and institutions within EMU[2].   Two guiding macroeconomic ideologies are important for understanding developments in European monetary integration: neoliberalism and Keynesianism. Neoliberalism is a highly contested term, although from an ideological standpoint it favours market based solutions and methods over  government  intervention (Holden 2011). In contrast, perhaps the most important insight of Keynesianism is the recognition of the need for  demand management by the state both in economic downturns and  booms (Skidelsky 1992, 572-624). Keynesian theory, therefore, demands a far more active role for the state in managing the economy through fiscal policy. Neoliberal ideas have been found to have become deeply embedded within the EMU policy framework, including the prevalence of ‘sound money’ and ‘sound finance’ ideas imparting fiscal discipline (Dyson 2002). There is no prior reason why neoliberalism should be associated with intergovernmentalism and Keynesianism with supranationalism. However, when applied to events taking place during the eurozone crisis, a Keynesianism philosophy demands a level of centralised fiscal solidarity amongst member states, which would imply edging towards a more supranational model of fiscal integration. On the contrary, building on, rather than replacing, the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) arrangements for fiscal discipline would preserve the intergovernmental logic of EMU governance, and is more aligned with neoliberal preferences. The focus here is on the framing activities that took place within the European Council and ECOFIN Council (shadowed by the informal ‘eurogroup’), althoughthese frames will also be located in the context of the wider crisis discussions taking place within the EU Commission and ECB settings. The analysis distinguishes between two distinct phases of the eurozone crisis: a crisis ‘escalation’ and crisis ‘normalisation’ phase. The crisis escalation phase can be traced back to the intensification of the global financial crisis in the summer of 2007. With attention focused on the frailties of the American financial system, the eurozone economy at first assumed a ‘safe-haven’ status for many commentators (Wyplosz 2009)—although there was some prescient warnings as to the multiple risks the downturn could pose to the institutions of the European single currency area (Feldstein 2008). In early 2010, following significant upwards revisions in the budget deficit figures for Greece,   there was a sudden erosion in market confidence in the Eurozone leading tolong-term government bond yield spreads increasing dramatically for the periphery member states (Checherita et al. 2010). With the risk of sovereign default  and uncontrollable  contagion  effects at its most serious, the President of the European Council, Herman Van Rompuy, swiftly put together a case for the supremacy of a European Council led Task Force in guiding a ‘fast-track’ process for EMU reform.    By the fall of 2012, market reactions towards the eurozone had normalised significantly. Key here was the ECB fulfilling its function as a lender of last resort (De Grauwe 2016, 126-141), which was aided by Mario Draghi’s  statement at the end of July 2012 that ‘[w]ithin our mandate, the ECB is ready to  do whatever it takes  to preserve the euro’. In response to the calming in market conditions, the attention of European leaders switched to the measures required to stabilise EMU over the longer term. Laying the foundations for these reform discussions were two strategic documents: the December 2012 report, prepared at the request of the European Council by President Van Rompuy, jointly with the Presidents of the European Commission, the ECB, and the Eurogroup, entitled Towards a Genuine Economic and Monetary Union and the Commission’s own A Blueprint for a Deep and Genuine Economic and Monetary Union: Launching a European Debate, published in November 2012. Building on the previous documents, in June 2015, the President of the Commission, in close cooperation with the Presidents of the Council, the ECB, the Eurogroup and the European Parliament, presented the so-called ‘Five Presidents’ Report’ entitled Completing Europe’s Economic and Monetary Union. Official documents and speeches throughout these deliberation phases will be supplemented by a series of semi-structured interviews that were conducted with senior EU officials located within the European Council, ECOFIN Council and DG ECFIN during the most important phases of the crisis. It is important to differentiate between the full internalisation of discourse within institutions and discourse that is deployed in rhetoric as a strategic political device (Hay 2006). Interview data is then useful for forming a comparison between communicative discourses to the general public and the internal coordinative discourses of policy construction taking place among policy actors (Schmidt 2008). Literature Review The escalation of the Eurozone crisis in 2010 fixed attention on the design failures of the eurozone and the practicalities of having a monetary union without the accompanying integration of the fiscal side (De Grauwe 2013). Since 2010, most of the reform proposals suggested to complete the architecture of EMU have centred on the prospect of implementing two neo-Keynesian fiscal solidarity mechanisms: 1) centralised fiscal capacity (or federal budget) for stabilisation purposes; 2) and the introduction of debt mutualisation schemes. A Policy Contribution for Bruegel details the four main options for developing a fiscal capacity for the eurozone with stabilisation functions: 1) unemployment insurance; 2) payments related to deviations of output from potential; 3) the narrowing of large spreads; 4) and discretionary spending (Wolf 2012). Suggestions for debt mutualisation include the so called European Safe Bonds (Euro-nomics group 2011) and Redemption bonds (Bofinger et al. 2011). In view of the salient features of fiscal policy, it is understood as imperative that progress towards a more supranational fiscal union is accompanied by deeper political integration to guarantee the democratic legitimacy of EMU governance (Schmidt, 2015). Despite calls being made for EMU to be completed through a process of supranational fiscal integration, there is an altogether different integration route that would maintain the intergovernmental logic of fiscal arrangements in Europe. Neoliberal monetarist principles are pervasive here, with discussions of fiscal solidarity being disregarded in favour of a limited fiscal discipline agenda (von Hagen et al. 2009; 2011). The main concern under this integration scenario is with heightened budgetary surveillance and enforcement mechanisms, which could be secured under the preventative and corrective arms of the pre-existing SGP framework. The fundamentally decentralised character of EU fiscal governance would also be preserved. In the literature, support for such a limited reform agenda is often supported by a belief that the eurozone crisis was primarily the result of excessive  fiscal profligacy  in the periphery member states (Sinn 2010). Of course, the distinct lack of political integration envisioned here would mean that channels of democratic legitimacy would remain largely indirect via member state governments. Through this discussion of the literature, two reform scenarios for EMU have been identified: intergovernmental and supranational. These two models can be understood as being supported by a selection of different policy  frames,  implying different definitions of what the  problem is and different ideas of what the suitable policy solutions  may be (see Table 1). First, the intergovernmental reform scenario is guided by a simplistic fiscal profligacy diagnosis of the eurozone crisis. Such an interpretation of the crisis strongly implies neoliberal policy solutions in the form of strengthened rules-based fiscal discipline. Framing the crisis in these more limited terms may also be both politically and intellectually attractive. This is because these frames do not demand challenging integration steps being taken towards a deeper level of fiscal and political union. Alternatively, the more far reaching supranational reform scenario is informed by a broader interpretation of the crisis problem as a problem of regional imbalances. In turn, possible solutions are understood as going far beyond neoliberal fiscal discipline in the direction of the implementation of neo-Keynesian solidarity measures, including debt mutualisation and an enlarged EU budget. The need to ensure the democratic legitimacy for decisions taken at the Union level is also problematized under this integration scenario, leading to demands for the simultaneous development of a flanking political union. Table 1: Framing the Eurozone Crisis Building on [name deleted for peer review] Framing the Eurozone Crisis   Crisis Escalation Phase Following the intensification of the global financial crisis in July 2007, the eurozone was at first considered by some to be a ‘safe haven’ (Wyplosz 2009). With the full implications of the deepening global financial crisis for the eurozone not yet apparent, the crisis problem was initially framed by European leaders as one created externally by the financial excesses built-up within the ‘Anglo-Saxon’ economies. As one DG ECFIN official observed, ‘Governments believed the crisis to have originated primarily in poor regulatory practices in New York and Londonand Europe was being pulled into the crisis through the global financial system’ (Secretariat Official in DG ECFIN 2 2013). A similar sentiment was also reflected in more communicative discourse as European leaders attempted to externalise the crisis. The German Chancellor, Angela Merkel, was uncompromising in asserting before the German Bundestag that ‘excessively cheap money in the US was a driver of today’s crises’ (Financial Times 2008). Moreover, French President, Nicolas Sarkozy, proclaimed in similar terms that ‘the crisis was a product of the Anglo-Saxon model’ (Financial Times 2009). Despite European leaders framing the 2008 financial collapse as an almost exclusively ‘Anglo-Saxon’ phenomenon with epicentres in New York and London, European leaders, led by Nicolas Sarkozy as the then acting president of the Council, did push for a strong coordinated European response alongside the G20 and American economies (Hodson 2011). In this early period, the framing of solutions to the crisis in Europe, overlapping with the international response and IMF recommendations, was guided heavily by Keynesian principles as leaders sought to avert financial contagion and recessionary spillovers into the real economy through coordinated fiscal expansion. In Europe, this translated into an attempt to combine both national and EU resources to ‘support demand’ and ‘cushion economies from the worst effects of the financial meltdown’ (Secretariat Official in DG ECFIN 1 2013). In November 2008, after an extraordinary summit of the euro area Heads of Government led by Nicolas  Sarkozy, the Commission proposed a Keynesian ‘European Economic Recovery plan’ (ECRP), which championed a substantial coordinated fiscal stimulus: ‘The Commission is proposing that, as a matter of urgency, Member States and the EU agree to an immediate budgetary impulse amounting to â‚ ¬ 200 billion (1.5% of GDP)’(Commission 2008). Importantly though, a key principal underpinning the plan was that any budgetary stimulus should be ‘timely, targeted, and temporary’—and that ‘Member States should commit to reverse the budgetary deterioration and return to the aims set out in the [SGP’s] medium term objectives’ (Commission 2008, 6-7).   As Joaquà ­n Almunia,  Vice President  of the European Commission, commented at the time: ‘we have red lines,  we cannot  put an excessive  burden  on  the next generation’ (Commission 2008a, 6). Similarly, the conclusions of the ECOFIN Council continued to support the long-term application of the SGP: ‘we remain fully committed to sound and sustainable public finances. The Stability and Growth Pact provides adequate flexibility to deal with these exceptional situations’ (Council 2009). Thus, while European leaders led by Nicolas  Sarkozy, along with the broader international community, embraced more Keynesian orientated fiscal stimulus in order to counter the expected downward trend in demand presented by the intensification of the global financial crisis, the long-term European commitment to the neoliberal rules-based SGP framework remained relatively stable during this early crisis period.   In the Spring of 2010 Greek public debt was downgraded by the main credit rating agencies to junk status and a growing spread in yields emerged in Eurozone sovereign bonds (Checherita et al. 2010). Recalling these events later, President Van Rompuy noted that this sudden loss of confidence in the Eurozone provoked by Greece was a ‘real shock’ for which ‘we were not prepared’ (Council 2014). As one official in DG ECFIN remarked: ‘It was now internal: a crisis of the Eurozone’ (Secretariat Official in DG ECFIN 2 2013). As the crisis intensified within the eurozone it was reframed by European leaders as a problem of fiscal profligacy amongst the periphery member states. On 11 February 2010, in a short emergency statement issued by Heads of State, they remarked that ‘all euro members must conduct sound national policies in accordance with the agreed rules’ (Council 2010). The discussion was also centred on Greece, with the Greek government being told ‘to implement all these measures in a rigorous and determined manner to effectively reduce the budgetary deficit by 4% in 2010’ (Council 2010). From a reading of the coordinative discourse, it was now Germany that was seen to be providing ideational leadership for framing the crisis in behavioural terms on Greek fiscal profligacy. As the largest eurozone country of course Germany’s voice was perhaps louder than the rest. I think it is fair to say that there was a perception in Germany that the troubles in the sovereign debt market had been caused by excessive government spending by certain periphery member states. (Council Directorate for Economic Policy Official 2013). The Commission also concurred with these views. In fact, the EU executive took the unprecedented step of issuing a series of strict recommendations to ensure that the budget deficit of Greece was brought below 3% of GDP by 2012 (Commission 2010a). Joaquà ­n Almunia,  Vice President  of the European Commission, commented that ‘this is the first time we have established such an intense and quasi-permanent system of monitoring’ (Commission 2010a). In response to the escalating crisis in the eurozone, President Van Rompuy argued the case in March 2010 for the pre-eminence of a European Council led Task Force in driving reform negotiations on EMU governance. The framing of policy solutions within the framework of the Task Force setting was guided more by a neoliberal ideology towards the imposition of strengthened intergovernmental fiscal discipline. In the first statement issued by the Task Force on the 25 March 2010, the shift in policy responses by European leaders was already firmly established: ‘the current situation demonstrates the need to strengthen and complement the existing framework to ensure fiscal sustainability in the euro zone’ (European Council 2010b). Moreover, the final conclusions of the March 2010 European Council summit further instructed the Task Force ‘to identify the measures needed  to  reach  the  objective  of an improved crisis resolution framework and  better budgetary disciplineexploring all options to reinforce the existing legal framework’ (European Council 2010a). Again, in the coordinative discourse, officials drew attention to the renewed ideational leadership played by Germany in framing policy solutions for the crisis: You have to understand that for Germany in particular the idea of having enforceable rules and sanctions to maintain budgetary discipline is central to their vision of how EMU should operate. And during the crisis it was Germany that pressed the hardest for heighted budgetary surveillance (Member of the Cabinet for the European Council President, 2014). A separate official commented on what they perceived as the inevitably of Germany’s leading role in setting the reform priorities within the task force: ‘But of course Germany takes a leading role here in view of its economic size. So Germany automatically was seen to take on a leading role, whether it wanted it or not ‘(Council Directorate for Economic Policy Official 2013). In contrast, French President, Nicolas Sarkozy led continued pleas for more fiscal solidarity: ‘The euro is our currency. It implies solidarity. There can be no doubt on the expression of this solidarity’ (BBC 2010). However, while it has been observed that ‘France under the stewardship of Sarkozy also had a role to play here’, it has been noted that he, in effect, was ‘forced to concede too many of Germany’s demands during the crisis deliberations’ (Council Directorate for Economic Policy Official 2013). Thus, while Nicolas Sarkozy played an important role in leading a more Keynesian international response at the onset of the global financial crisis, as the crisis intensified within the eurozone the French President was forced to abandon solutions involving fiscal solidarity in favour of Germany’s more limited fiscal discipline objectives.    These framing priorities were reflected in the Final Report of the Task Force released to the public in October 2010. The main pillar of the suggested reforms was geared towards ‘greater fiscal discipline through a stronger stability and growth pact’ (European Council 2010, 3-4).   As part of its ongoing institutional dialogue with the Task Force, the ECB also offered its public support for legislative measures supporting a more rigorous  Ã¢â‚¬Ëœquasi-automatic’ implementation of the SGP rules (ECB 2010). Three key objectives were embedded in the Final Report of the Task Force: ‘the need for a greater focus on debt and fiscal sustainability’, ‘to reinforce compliance’ and ‘to ensure that national fiscal frameworks reflect the EUs fiscal rules’ (European Council 2010, 1-12). In remarks following the final meeting of the Task Force, President Van Rompuy documented that the ‘task forces commitment to a stronger Pact was high from the beginning to the end’ (European Council 2010c). Converging with the framing   activities of the Task Force, in September 2010 the Commission proposed the so-called ‘six-pack’ of legislative proposals centred on the concept of ‘prudent fiscal policy-making’ (Commission 2010, 1). These ‘fast-tracked’ proposals sought to strengthen the impact and effectiveness of the preventative arm of the SGP by giving it ‘teeth’ (EU Commission 2010, 4-5). These early framing activities led by deliberations within the Task Force also helped set the subsequent policy agenda in the form of a legislative ‘two-pack’ (proposed in November 2011) and intergovernmental ‘fiscal compact’ (agreed 8-9 December 2011). Building on the legislative six-pack, both measures were limited to strengthening intergovernmental fiscal discipline under the SGP, through strengthened budgetary surveillance and reinforced compliance (see Commission 2012). Crisis Normalisation Phase From the summer of 2012 to the winter of 2013 there was a gradual reduction in the eurozone periphery bond yield spreads. Key here was the ECB fulfilling its function as a lender of last resort (De Grauwe 2013; 2016). With the ECB able to temporarily normalise market reactions within the eurozone, it offered the prospect that European leaders may seek to reframe the crisis as demanding more supranational solutions. This assumption appeared to be confirmed when President Herman Van Rompuy, following a European Council summit at the end of June 2012, first mentioned the prospect of laying down a ‘longer-term vision’ for strengthening EMU (European Council 2012c). Following prior negotiations in the European Council, President Van Rompuy, jointly with the Presidents of the European Commission, the ECB, and the Eurogroup, presented in December 2012 a report entitled Towards a Genuine Economic and Monetary Union. However, despite the possibility of a critical juncture event, the framing of policy solutions within the report continued to prioritise the strengthening of intergovernmental fiscal discipline over the short-term. The near term priority is to complete and implement the new steps for stronger economic governanceThe other elements related to strengthening fiscal governance in the euro area (‘Two-Pack’), which are still in the legislative process, should be finalised urgently and be implemented thoroughly (European Council 2012, 8). These reform priorities were also reflected in the coordinative discourse: ‘The priority has remained the implementation of the measures contained in the ‘‘six-pack’’ and ‘‘two-pack’’ proposals’ (Council Directorate for Economic Policy Official 2013). And again, Germany’s ideational leadership in framing policy solutions was observed to be pivotal here: ‘There is an understanding amongst member states that budget discipline has to be ensured before more financial support can be offered. This is also a German insistence’ (Council Directorate for Economic Policy Official, 2013). Moreover, while the ECB internally called for a ‘quantum leap’ in integration within EMU, this was strictly interpreted in terms of ‘further strengthening the budgetary discipline of the euro area Member States’ (ECB 2012:8). When discussing the reform solutions for implementation over the long-term (five years and more), there was a shift in the discourse of the Towards a Genuine Economic and Monetary Union report towards the language of supranationalism. However, these framing devices were only reflective of a limited reform ambition. For example, the report mentions the possibility of gradually developing a ‘fiscal capacity’, which could help ‘cushion the impact of country-specific shocks’ and ‘prevent contagion across the euro area’ (European Council 2012, 9). Yet the precise form that any fiscal capacity should take within the euro area was left vague, with the report acknowledging that ‘the exact conditions and thresholds for the activation of transfers would need to be studied carefully’ (European Council 2012, 11). Moreover, it was also emphasised that the development of a fiscal capacity within the eurozone should ‘not lead to  permanent transfers  between countries’ and that this process should occur ‘without resorting to the mutualisation of sovereign debt’ (European Council 2012, 10-12). Tellingly, within the subsequent Conclusions of the December 2012 European Council, any mention of a fiscal capacity or shock absorption function for EMU was omitted, along with plans for debt-mutualisation (European Council   2012a). In the coordinative discourse, officials were able to account for the limited ambition shown in framing supranational solutions to the eurozone crisis by pointing towards a mixture of sovereignty concerns and issues of moral hazard amongst member states. For example, one official highlighted the constraining influence of these national interest ideas on integration within EMU: A degree of debt mutualisation or financial risk sharing could, in theory, help lower borrowing costs amongst the periphery member states and help ward off pressure from the financial markets but it effectively means the transfer of sovereignty, at least to some extent. That is the biggest obstacle: that is what it is all about. In the end it comes down to sovereignty and money (Council Directorate for Economic Policy Official 2013). Similar ideas were raised by one official who, when asked to comment on the probability of securing supranational fiscal integration, answered candidly: ‘I think it is not very probable because of state sovereignty concerns’ (Advisor to the Cabinet of the European Council President 2014). The official argued that this is because a ‘fiscal union with tax powers going to the European Union level would be completely turning upside down the way the Union is currently running’ (Advisor to the Cabinet of the European Council President 2014). A separate official also drew attention to the importance of ‘concerns of moral hazard’, predominantly amongst the ‘core member states who want to be able to influence the periphery member states’ debt situation’ (Member of the Cabinet for the European Council President 2014). There were also discussions in the Towards a Genuine Economic and Monetary Union report concerning the development of a flanking ‘political union’ aspect, although again the supranational framing of the discourse was lacking in ambition.   In order to underpin the ‘democratic legitimacy and accountability’ of decision making the report called for the ‘the involvement of the European Parliament as regards accountability for decisions taken at the European level’, while at the same time ‘maintaining the pivotal role of national parliaments, as appropriate’ (European Council 2012, 16-17). The promise to maintain a ‘pivotal’ role for national parliaments, even in the event of a vertical transfer of powers to the European level, would appear to stem from an observation made in the report that ‘decisions on national budgets are at the heart of Member States parliamentary democracies’ (European Council 2012, 16). The report, then, explicitly divorced itself from supranational political solutions. In the coordinative discourse, sovereignty concerns were again raised as major hurdle to political integration: ‘People have different interests and different concepts of what a political union would be and as to what sovereign powers should be transferred’—adding that ‘we are not even discussing this’ (Council Directorate for Economic Policy Official 2013). In November 2012 the Commission published its own Communication outlining A blueprint for a deep and genuine economic and monetary union: Launching a European Debate. Converging with the Van Rompuy report, the immediate framing of policy solutions was restricted to fiscal discipline objectives: ‘immediate priority should be given to the full deployment of the new economic governance tools brought by the ‘‘six-pack’’ as well as rapid adoption of current Commission proposals such as the ‘‘two-pack’’ (Commission 2012, 12). Once again, like the Van Rompuy report, the blueprint did cautiously embed more supranational frames when addressing the long-term reform agenda for EMU (five years and more). This is in keeping with the EU Commission’s pledge that ‘steps towards more responsibility and economic discipline should be combined with more solidarity and financial support’ (EU Commission 2012, 11). Accordingly, the framing of solutions shifted to demand more in the way of fiscal solidarity, with tentative ideas for a ‘fiscal capacity’ (or ‘federal budget’) and even ‘debt mutualisation’ schemes being   aired as possibilities ‘to support member states in the absorption of economic shocks’ (Commission 2012, 25-26). However, these solidarity mechanisms were envisioned as being implemented strictly after the new arrangements for fiscal discipline have been fully implemented. Also, the procedural details and legal basis for the solidarity mechanisms was left vague, with proposal covering options from ‘contractual arrangements’ to an ‘insurance’ type system. As one official commented: ‘I think there needs to be some ingredients of fiscal union. It’s not entirely clear which ones and to what extent; there are different views and these are tricky questions’ (Senior Fiscal Policy Advisor in DG ECFIN 2013). Moreover, the blueprint also shied away from committing itself to any process of supranational political integration, with the EU Commission arguing that the ‘the Lisbon Treaty has perfected the EUs unique model of supranational democracy’ (Commission 2012, 35).   In June 2015, the President of the Commission, in close cooperation with the Presidents of the Council, the ECB, the Eurogroup and the European Parliament, presented the so-called ‘Five Presidents’ Report’ entitled Completing Europe’s Economic and Monetary Union. It is notable that in the updated report the framing of policy solutions for fiscal integration was even less ambitious than it had been in earlier institutional reports drafted during earlier periods of the crisis. Apart from repeating the need to improve compliance with the new rules contained in the ‘six-pack’, ‘two-pack’ and Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance, there were no institutional innovations suggested for implementation over the short-term. Instead, intergovernmental fiscal discipline was again framed as the priority solution—with repeated references made to ‘responsible budgetary policies’ (Commission 2015, 14). The report also warned that ‘every Member State must stick to the rules, or the credibility of this framework is at risk’ (Commission 2015, 14-15).   In terms of the framing of solutions over the longer-term (five years or more), previous references to a ‘fiscal capacity’ and limited forms of debt mutualisation were completely omitted. Instead, the Five Presidents tentatively floated the idea of a ‘euro area-wide fiscal stabilisation function’ (Commission 2015, 14-15). Postponed strictly for ‘in the longer term’, the development of such a   function is envisioned as the culmination of a process of ‘convergence’ and ‘further pooling’ of decision-making on national budgets (Commission 2015, 14-155).   The report also cautioned that ‘it should not lead to permanent transfers between countries’ and that efforts should be made to ‘guarantee it is consistent with the existing EU fiscal framework’ (Commission 2015, 15). Tellingly the report was also explicit that ‘the exact design of such euro area stabilisers requires more in-depth work’ (Commission 2015, 14). As part of the Commission Presidents’ 2015 ‘State of the Union’ address, he argued for ‘a more effective and democratic system of economic and fiscal surveillance’ (Commission 2015a). However, there was again a noticeable lack of progress on political union. While the report affirmed ‘a key role for the European Parliament and national Parliaments’, practical steps to ensure the democratic legitimacy of decision making were limited to proposals to consolidate the external representation of the euro and the integration intergovernmental solutions (i.e. Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance) within the EU legal framework (Commission 2015, 17-18). Framing in Context The dominant framing activities uncovered need to be understood in the context of the wider EMU policy environment. One of the key foundations of EMU was the ideational consensus reached in Europe on neoliberal economic principles in the 1980’s (McNamara 1998). However, while there developed a relative consensus that monetary policy would function in accordance with neoliberal principles, very little thought was given during the deliberations at Maastricht on the 1992 Treaty on European Union (TEU) as to the possibility of accompanying these integration steps with progress towards a supranational fiscal union. As Verdun commented:   ‘Fiscal policy harmonisation was just simply one step too far; there was no support for a transfer of sovereignty over these matters to the European level’ (Verdun 1998, 122). From an early stage, therefore, political necessity dictated that fiscal policy would remain firmly in the intergovernmental realm. Yet from the perspective of underpinning EMU with an institutional framework that is in keeping with neoliberal ideas of ‘sound money’ and ‘sound finance’ (Dyson 2002), European economic and monetary integration was not completed at Maastricht. It was against this backdrop that the then German Minister for finance, Theo Waigel, advanced a proposal for a rules-based ‘Stability Pact for Europe’ in 1996. In summary, owning to the political constraints preventing fiscal supranationalism, coupled with the importation of neoliberal ideas, intergovernmental fiscal discipline became institutionalised at heart of EMU early on. Since its formation, the course of EU fiscal governance reform has been characterised by a strong ‘path-dependency’ (Pierson 1996). In fact, in view of the path-dependent constraints of the political environment, on top of the prevailing neoliberal ideational consensus, the rules-based framework for EU fiscal governance was never seriously challenged by European leaders throughout the first ten years of the single currency area (see Heipertz and Verdun 2011. While the onset of the eurozone crisis had the potential to represent a ‘critical juncture’ in the path for EMU integration (Bulmer 1994), the revival of concerns amongst member states over sovereignty and moral hazard have continued to render the intergovernmental structure of EMU a political necessity. However, although the minimal structure of EMU remains a manifestation of different conceptions of national interest, the prevailing neoliberal ideology has simultaneously continued to condition perceptions as to the efficacy of the SGP rules-based framework for fiscal discipline. Thus, while French President Nicolas Sarkozy, in tandem with the international community, was seen to be influential in leading a brief resurgence of more Keynesian oriented demand stimulus during the early stages of the crisis, European leaders defended the continued application of the SGP as the overarching framework for EU fiscal governance. The dramatic shift in early 2010 from ‘Anglo-Saxon’ external excesses to the internal vulnerabilities within the eurozone only exaggerated the path-dependent effect of competing national interests amongst member states while reinforcing the reversion to neoliberal solutions.   First, policy makers were responding with a degree of shock and panic to a crisis of potentially ‘existential proportions’ (as termed by a Member of the Cabinet for the European Council President, 2014). Operating in this environment of crisis, diagnosing the crisis in behavioural terms as resulting from fiscal profligacy and offering intergovernmental reform solutions limited to strengthening the SGP would have been both intellectually and politically attractive. Not only were these policy frames fully in line with the neoliberal logic of ‘sound  money  and finance’ enshrined since Maastricht (Dyson 2002), but they could also be implemented via secondary legislation under the current legal basis provided by the SGP framework. Moreover, buttressed by its economic weight and its considerable structural power within the EMU set-up, Germany was also increasingly in a strong position to provide ideational leadership in framing neoliberal solutions to the crisis. This can be contrasted with France who, as the crisis progressed, was forced to abandon more Keynesian solutions in favour of Germany’s more limited fiscal discipline objectives. Conclusion The intensification of the crisis within the eurozone brought with it a marked intensification of intergovernmental policy coordination within EMU. As the crisis progressed, the response by European leaders was to adopt problem and solution frames supporting intergovernmental fiscal discipline. Importantly, these frames were intellectually attractive as they were fully consistent with the neoliberal foundations underpinning EMU governance. Also, these frames were politically simple to express as they could be implemented in full under the pre-existing SGP legal framework. While there was a partial shift in the discourse towards supranationalism following the normalisation of the crisis, these discourses were always reflective of a limited reform ambition. In this context, a supranational framing of the crisis was found to be limited by constraining ideas of national interest concerning state sovereignty and issues moral hazard. Germany was also able to draw on its economic weight and bargaining power to provide ideational leadership, further directing the reform agenda towards intergovernmental fiscal discipline. In relation to the wider literature, these findings are broadly consistent with ‘new intergovernmentalist’ claims that supranationalism is unlikely to be obtained in the post Maastricht integration phase. This study though has helped develop a deeper political understanding of the current integration impasse in EU fiscal governance, and of the ideational and institutional path-dependencies working to limit the scope for far reaching reform. This analysis has also contributed to existing critical analysis on European integration by emphasising the central importance of neoliberal ideology in guiding framing preferences. Finally, one major consequence of these findings is that the imbalance between monetary and fiscal integration within the EMU framework will likely remain. However, further investigation will be needed to assess the long-term sustainability of running a single currency area with a decentralised system of fiscal policy. 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Adviser on policy coordination and strategic planning   Senior Fiscal Policy Advisor in DG ECFIN (2013) Interviewed by the author (Brussels, 23rd September). Senior fiscal policy advisor Senior Director in DG ECFIN (2013) Interviewed by the author (Brussels, 26th September). Senior official in charge of coordination work in DG ECFIN [1] [name deleted for peer review]. [2] Informed by the wider ‘new institutionalism’ literature, this broader theoretical exploration charts the ideational  as well  institutional path dependences working to limit the scope for reform within EMU (Bulmer 1994; Pierson 1996; Hay, 2006).